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MARKET DISRUPTION CAUSED BY IMPORTS FROM
COMMUNIST COUNTRIES: ANALYSIS OF
SECTION 406 OF THE TRADE ACT
OF 1974

The escape clause provides emergency relief to domestic producers injured by increased import competition.' The United States
currently furnishes such relief under section 201 of the Trade Act of
3
1974,2 the successor to a line of escape clauses dating back to 1951.
Along with section 201, Congress enacted a special escape
clause, section 406 of the Trade Act of 1974,4 that deals solely with
market disruption caused by communist countries. 5 Because it uses
less strenuous tests, for market disruption, 6 section 406 provides an
easier route to the imposition of trade restrictions than does section
201. Section 406 is, therefore, a ready and powerful tool for limiting
7
imports from both developed and developing communist nations.
1. For a general discussion of the escape clause, see J. JACKSON, WORLD TRADE
GATT 553-573 (1969); Jacobs & Hove, Remediesfor UnfairImport
Competition in the UnitedStates, 13 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 1, 21-23 (1980).
2. Trade Act of 1974, § 201, 19 U.S.C. § 2251 (1976).
3. Congress first enacted the escape clause in the Trade Agreements Extension Act
of 1951, Pub. L. No. 78-50, § 7, 65 Stat. 72 (repealed 1962). Congress re-enacted the
escape clause in the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-794, § 301(b)(1), 76
Stat. 872 (amended 1974). Finally, Congress amended the 1962 version in section 201 of
the Trade Act of 1974, note 2 supra.
4. Trade Act of 1974, § 406, 19 U.S.C. § 2436 (1976).
5. Section 406 defines "Communist Country" as "[alny country dominated or controlled by communism." 19 U.S.C. § 2436(e)(1) (1976).
6. To successfully maintain a section 406 action, a domestic plaintiff must prove
that the communist country's imports are "increasingrapidy, either absolutely or relatively, so as to be a significantcause of materialinjury, or a threat thereof," to a domestic
industry producing a like or directly competitive product. 19 U.S.C. § 2436(e)(2) (1976)
(emphasis added). To successfully maintain a section 201 action, a domestic plaintiff
must prove that an article is being imported in such "increasedquantities as to be a substantialcause of serious injury, or the threat thereof," to a domestic industry producing a
like or directly competitive product. 19 U.S.C. § 225 l(b)(1) (1976) (emphasis added).
The wording of these two statutes clearly promotes the congressional intent that the section 406 tests be easier to satisfy than the section 201 tests. S. REP. No. 93-1298, 93d
Cong., 2d Sess. 212 (1974) [hereinafter cited as SENATE REPORT], reprintedin [1974] U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 7186, 7343-44.
7. To date, there are only six reported cases under section 406. The cases, in chronological order, are: Certain Gloves From the People's Republic of China, U.S. Int'l
Trade Comm'n Publ. No. 867 (March, 1978); Clothespins From the People's Republic of
China, the Polish People's Republic, and the Socialist Republic of Romania, U.S. Int'l
Trade Comm'n Publ. No. 902 (Aug., 1978); Anhydrous Ammonia From the U.S.S.R.,
U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n Publ. No. 1,006 (Oct., 1979); and Anhydrous Ammonia From
the U.S.S.R., U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n Publ. No. 1,051 (April, 1980).
AND THE* LAW OF
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This Note first probes the reasons for enacting a special escape
clause to deal with imports from communist countries. Second, it
analyzes the tests for market disruption under section 406 and compares them to the section 201 tests. Third, it discusses the choice of
remedies available under section 406 as assessed and implemented in
the cases to date. Finally, the Note evaluates the weaknesses of section 406 and suggests possible improvements in its application.
I
THE PURPOSE OF SECTION 406
The theory behind the escape clause is simple. Tariffs serve as a
protective device for domestic producers by increasing the exporter's
costs in the importing country. These additional costs make it more
difficult for an exporter to undercut a domestic producer's prices.
The escape clause mechanism protects domestic producers by
allowing the importing country to unilaterally increase the tariff burden on imports that it finds injurious to those producers.
The United States first bargained for an escape clause in trade
negotiations with Mexico in 1942.8 In 1947, the escape clause concept was included in Article XIX of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT).9 Pursuant to the GATT mandate, Congress
enacted section 7 of the Trade Agreements Extension Act of 1951,10
thereby implementing the escape clause into U.S. law. The United
States currently furnishes escape clause relief under section 201 of
the Trade Act of 1974.11
Congress feared, however, that section 201 could not adequately
remedy market disruption caused by imports from communist countries.' 2 Congress viewed such market disruption as potentially more
dangerous than the disruption caused by imports from non-statecontrolled economies for three reasons.
The first reason is inherent in the nature of a communist country's centrally planned economy. In a free enterprise system, private
industries are motivated to allocate resources in such a way that
those resources will produce maximum profits. In a communist
8. Reciprocal Trade Agreement with Mexico, openedfor signature Dec. 23, 1942,
art. XI, 57 Stat. 845 (1943), E.A.S. No. 311 (in effect Jan. 30, 1943).
9. Openedfor signature Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-Il, T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S.
194. The agreement has been modified in several respects since 1947. The current version is contained in 4 GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TARIFFS AND TRADE, BASIC INSTRUMENTS AND SELECTED DOCUMENTS (1969).
10. Pub. L. No. 78-50, § 7, 65 Stat. 72 (repealed 1962).
11. Trade Act of 1974, § 201, 19 U.S.C. § 2251 (1976).
12. See SENATE REPORT, .supranote 6, at 210, reprintedin [1974] U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEWS 7186, 7342.
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country, however, resource allocation and product distribution decisions are not motivated by economic considerations alone. The state
controls the manufacture of goods, the distribution process, and the
price at which articles are sold. Consequently, the communist state
may concentrate its resources on one particular product and direct

that product's export so as to flood U.S. markets much more quickly
than could a foreign private industry whose decisions are based upon

13
economic considerations alone.
Second, Congress evinced a concern with the inability of the
government to apply the traditional antidumping statute to remedy
market disruption caused by the use of unfair trade practices by
communist countries.14 This inability stems from the difficulty in
evaluating communist economies by western market economy stan-

dards. For example, consider the typical dumping case. Dumping
occurs when the exporting nation sells its products at a price lower
than the fair market value of that product in the exporting country.' 5
State-controlled economies, however, do not subscribe to market

pricing, te., prices bear little or no relation to demand or economic
cost. Therefore, because it would be impossible to ascertain the fair

market value of a product in a communist country, it would be
equally impossible to determine whether dumping exists.' 6 Hence,

the traditional antidumping remedy was, in effect, unavailable when
7
a communist country was the exporter.'

13. Id.
14. The most prevalent unfair trade practice is dumping. For a description of dumping, see text accompanying note 15 infra. To offset the unfair competitive advantage
achieved through dumping, the government imposes an antidumping duty upon the
imports. 19 U.S.C.A. § 1673 (West 1980). For a discussion of the U.S. antidumping
legislation, see Jacobs & Hove, Remediesfor Unfair Import Competition in the United
States, 13 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 1, 5-13 (1980).
15. See note 14 supra.
16. For a good example of this difficulty, see Electric Golf Carts from Poland, U.S.
Int'l Trade Comm'n Publ. No. 740 (March, 1975). This difficulty has been eliminated by
section 101 of the Trade Agreements Act of 1979, 19 U.S.C.A. § 1677(b) (West 1980),
which sets forth tests for the determination of the fair market value of products manufactured in non-market economies. The implications of this section are explored at notes
96-100 infra and accompanying text.
17. A particularly illuminating description of this problem was made by Dr. Harald
B. Malmgren:
Senator Fannin raised the issue by saying: 'You fellows in the Executive Branch
have been thinking about this for a lot of years, and you still don't know what
you're doing here; and I don't think anyone knows what we're doing here.
We've got a problem, and yet you fellows think you're really smart. You've got
all your lawyers and academics here. You don't know whether you want to use
antidumping, countervailing, escape clause-you don't know and neither do I.
So why don't we put [section 406] in, and if you can't handle them any other way
they'll get clobbered by this one. We will just work it out on a case-by-case
basis.'
INTERFACE ONE 67 (D. Wallace, G. Spina, & R. Rawson eds. 1980).
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Finally, Congress voiced the traditional fear of dependence on a
communist country for vital raw materials.' 8 Although Congress did
not wish to preclude imports of vital raw materials from communist
sources, it did wish to ensure that they were held to a reasonable
level. By doing so, Congress hoped to protect traditional dependable
suppliers, domestic or foreign, from the threat of periodic dumping
or other disruptive sales practices.19 Assuring non-communist sup-

pliers that they will always be able to compete in the U.S. market
guarantees the availability of materials essential to the functioning of
the U.S. economy and to the maintenance of its national defense.
Whether Congress' distrust of communist imports rests on a fear for

national security, on a suspicion of predatory intent, or on a combination of the two is not clear from the legislative history.
In addition to the above three reasons cited by Congress, U.S.

domestic producers raised an additional reason for singling out
imports from communist countries for special treatment. They
argued that communist countries are generally not signatories to bior multi-lateral trade agreements between producers. Because signatories to such agreements bind themselves to predetermined annual
increases in exports to the United States, U.S. domestic producers

can accurately predict the effect of those imports on their market.
They cannot, however, predict the exact level of imports from non-

signatory communist countries. This makes it more difficult for
domestic producers to set their own levels of production and makes

them more vulnerable to market disruption from communist
sources.

20

The above reasons prompted Congress to enact a special escape
clause, section 406 of the Trade Act of 1974,21 to provide a special
remedy for market disruption caused by imports from communist

countries.
18. SENATE REPORT, supra note 6, at 210-11, reprintedin [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. &

AD. NEWS 7186, 7342-43. Congress lists oil, gas, nickel, chromium, manganese, and
other examples as vital raw materials. Id.
19. Id. Although the Senate contemplated allowing foreign nations or other foreign
entities to bring section 406 actions, the Conference Report expressly states that "foreign
entities would not be eligible to petition for relief under either section 201 or section
406." H. CONF. REP. No. 93-1644, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 49 (1974), reprintedin [1974] U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 7367, 7393.

20. Certain Gloves from the People's Republic of China, U. S. Int'l Trade Comm'n
Publ. No. 867, at 18, 27-30 (March, 1978). In Gloves, the relevant industry trade agreement was the Multi-Fiber Agreement (MFA). Since the terms of the MFA prevented its
signatories from satisfying a large amount of the increase in the U.S. demand for gloves,
this demand could only be satisfied by U.S., Chinese or other non-signatory producers.
In this way, U.S. producers, not knowing the level at which these non-signatory producers would increase their imports of gloves, were especially vulnerable. The effectiveness
of the MFA was thereby minimized. Id
21. Trade Act of 1974, § 406, 19 U.S.C. § 2436 (1976).
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II
REQUIREMENTS FOR A HOLDING OF MARKET
DISRUPTION UNDER SECTION 406
To effectuate the purposes of section 406, Congress carefully
chose words that differed from those of section 201. Section
406(a)(1) authorizes the International Trade Commission to investigate and determine whether market disruption exists. 22 The test for
market disruption, set out in section 406(e)2, provides that:
Market disruption exists within a domestic industry whenever imports of an
article, like or directly competitive with an article produced by such domestic
industry, are increasing rapidly, either absolutely or relatively, so as to be a
cause of material injury, or threat thereof, to such domestic indussignificant
3
try.

2

The major elements of this test-"increasing rapidly," "material
injury," and "significant cause"-are explored separately in the discussion below.
A.

IMPORTS MUST BE INCREASING RAPIDLY

Under section 406, if a domestic plaintiff wishes to restrict the
importation of a directly competitive article, he must first show that
imports of that article are "increasing rapidly," in either absolute or
relative terms. 24 This differs from section 201, which merely requires
that the imports be in "increased quantities. ' 25 Hence, the increas-

ing imports standard of section 406 differs from the comparable standard of section 201 in a surprising way: the increasing rapidly test of

section 406 is harder to satisfy than the increased quantities standard
of section 201. In this respect, a check is imposed on the otherwise

more lenient granting of import relief under section 406.
The International Trade Commission interprets the increasing
rapidly test as requiring both a rapid and a recent rise in the level of
imports.26 Congress phrased the requirement in the present tense,
indicating its intent that the increase be a current one.27 "Rapidly"
22. 19 U.S.C. § 2436(a)(1) (1976).
23. 19 U.S.C. § 2436(e)(2) (1976).
24. Id
25. 19 U.S.C. § 2251(b)(1) (1976).
26. Certain Gloves From the People's Republic of China, U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n
Publ. No. 867, at 11 (March, 1978); Clothespins From the People's Republic of China,
the Polish People's Republic, and the Socialist Republic of Romania, U.S. Int'l Trade
Comm'n Publ. No. 902, at 12, 18, 31-32 (Aug., 1978); Anhydrous Ammonia From the
U.S.S.R., U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n Publ. No. 1,006, at 4 (Oct., 1979); Anhydrous Ammonia From the U.S.S.R., U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n Publ. No. 1,051, at 23-24, 32 (April,
1980).
27. The Senate Finance Committee stated, "[t]he increase in imports required by the
market disruption criteria must have occurred during a recent period of time, as determined by the Commission taking into account any historical trade levels which may have
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is generally given its ordinary dictionary definition. 28 Although the
Commissioners agree on the volume of imports necessary to fulfill
this requirement, they have differed in their opinions of the time
period in which the increase must occur.
These differences are best illustrated in Certain Gloves From the
People'sRepublic of China.2 9 In that case, Commissioner Joseph 0.
Parker examined the import levels year by year. Although the
imports increased in some of the years between 1972-1976, Parker
held that the decrease in imports in 1977 was sufficient to support a
finding that the imports were not presently increasing rapidly at the
time of the investigation.30 Conversely, Commissioner Daniel
Minchew, in dissent, compared the import levels of two groups of
years (1973-75 and 1976-77). This grouping approach masked the
1977 decline in imports. Minchew, therefore, found that imports had
increased 550% between these two periods and would have held that
31
imports were presently increasing rapidly.
The International Trade Commission treats the increasing rap32
idly requirement as the threshold issue in section 406 cases.
Clothespins From the People's Republic of China, the Polish People's
Republic, and the Socialist Republic of Romania33 illustrate the

importance of dealing with this requirement first. In those cases, the
complainant charged that imports of clothespins from Poland,
Romania, and China caused market disruption. Because Polish and
Romanian imports were either close to or below the previous year's
level, the Commissioners held that these imports were not increasing
rapidly.34 Having resolved the threshold issue in the negative, the
Commission necessarily found that there was no market disruption,
and consequently abandoned any examination of the remaining eleexisted."

SENATE REPORT,

supra note 6, at 212, reprintedin [1974] U.S.

CODE CONG.

&

AD. NEWS 7186, 7344 (emphasis added); Certain Gloves From the People's Republic of
China, U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n Publ. No. 867, at 11 (March, 1978); Clothespins From
the People's Republic of China, the Polish People's Republic, and the Socialist Republic
of Romania, U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n Publ. No. 902, at 6 (Aug., 1978).

28. Anhydrous Ammonia From the U.S.S.R., U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n Publ. No.
1,051, at 23-24 (April, 1980).

29. U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n Publ. No. 867 (March, 1978).
30. Id at 11-12.
31. Id at 20-22.

32. Certain Gloves From the People's Republic of China, U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n
Publ. No. 867 (March, 1978); Clothespins From the People's Republic of China, the
Polish People's Republic, and the Socialist Republic of Romania, U.S. Int'l Trade
Comm'n Publ. No. 902 (Aug., 1978); Anhydrous Ammonia From the U.S.S.R., U.S. Int'l
Trade Comm'n Publ. No. 1,006 (Oct., 1979); Anhydrous Ammonia From the U.S.S.R.,
U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n Publ. No. 1,051 (April, 1980).
33. U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n Publ. No. 902 (Aug., 1978).
34. Id at 13.
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ments of a section 406 claim. 35 China, however, had doubled its
imports between 1976 and 1977, clearly meeting the increasing rapidly requirement. 36 Accordingly, the Commission proceeded to
examine the other elements of section 406, and ultimately found that
Chinese imports were causing market disruption.3 7 Because the
remaining two tests for market disruption are easier to satisfy than
their section 201 counterparts, the domestic plaintiff greatly
enhances his chances of securing a favorable decision under section
406 once he has satisfied the increasing rapidly requirement.

B.

MATERIAL INJURY

A section 406 plaintiff must next prove that he has suffered a
"material injury." 38 Unfortunately, the legislative history of section
406 provides little guidance as to what degree of injury constitutes
material injury.
In what may be viewed as a subsequent declaration of the
degree of injury they intended section 406 to redress, Congress used
and defined the words "material injury" in the Trade Agreements
Act of 1979. The Act defines material injury as "harm which is not
inconsequential, immaterial, or unimportant." 39 Such a definition,
framed in the negative, seems to require a degree of injury quite low
on the spectrum of potential injuries.
The question that arises is whether the definition of material
injury in the Trade Agreements Act of 1979 likewise applies to the
term material injury as used in section 406, passed some five years
earlier. Section 406 addresses injuries caused by fair, but disruptive
trade practices. 4° In contrast, the Trade Agreements Act of 1979
addresses injuries caused by unfair trade practices. 41 In light of this
difference, any application of the Act's material injury definition to
section 406 may well be erroneous.4 2 Nonetheless, in both section
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.

Id
Id at 17-18.

Id

19 U.S.C. § 2436(e)(2) (1976).
19 U.S.C.A. § 1677(7)(A) (West 1980).
See pp. 118-21 supra.
See generaly Lowenfeld, Fair or Unfair Trade: Does it Matter?, 13 CORNELL
INT'L L.J. 205 (1980).
42. On the other hand, there is some indication in the legislative history of section
406 that, because of the nature of a communist economy and the ability of a communist
government to disproportionately focus resources on a particular product, see p. 119
supra, Congress presumed that any import competition from communist countries was
per se unfair. See SENATE REPORT, supra note 6, at 211, reprintedin [1974] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 7186, 7342. This presumption seems tenable in that there is really
no practical difference between the focusing of resources on a particular import, and the
granting of a subsidy to the industry that manufactures the imported product. The latter
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406 investigations conducted subsequent to the enactment of the
Trade Agreements Act of 1979, 43 Commissioners Paula Stem and
Bill Alberger considered the Act's definition of material injury useful
in determining whether the plaintiffs in those cases had suffered a
material injury.44 In his concurrence to the second Anhydrous
Ammonia case, however, Commissioner Michael Calhoun expressly
disassociated himself from that part of the majority opinion. 45 Nevertheless, the mention of the Trade Agreements Act of 1979 in these
recent section 406 decisions shows a willingness on the part of at
least some members of the International Trade Commission to assess
material injury along the lines of the "not inconsequential, immaterial, or unimportant" definition contained in the 1979 Act.
The legislative history of section 406 clearly indicates that Congress intended to make the injury test for section 406 relief easier to
meet than section 201's "serious injury" test. 46 The Commissioners,
however, have not been able to provide any additional guidance as
to what degree of injury satisfies the "material" requirement.
Rather, the Commissioners admit that the term "material injury" is
not rigid or capable of specific measurement, and that the meaning
they give this term is "necessarily a matter of judgment, dependent
upon an analysis of the relevant facts with respect to the issues
involved.

'47

The Commissioners have agreed on the factors to consider
when determining the degree of injury that the plaintiff has suffered.
Although section 406 contains no specific list of factors to consider
for this purpose, the Commission uniformly evaluates the injury in
section 406 cases according to the same factors spelled out in the
injury test of section 201.48 The Commission, therefore, looks to economic indicators such as the idling of productive facilities in the
practice, subsidization, is clearly an unfair trade practice. See generaly Lowenfeld,
supra note 41. Consequently, the application of the material injury standard of the
Trade Agreements Act of 1979 may not be as erroneous as it originally seems.
43. Anhydrous Ammonia From the U.S.S.R., U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n Publ. No.
1,006 (Oct., 1979); Anhydrous Ammonia From the U.S.S.R., U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n
Publ. No. 1,051 (April, 1980).
44. Anhydrous Ammonia From the U.S.S.R., U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n Publ. No.
1,006, at 24 (Oct., 1979); Anhydrous Ammonia From the U.S.S.R., U.S. Int'l Trade
Comm'n Publ. No. 1,051, at 5 n.6 (April, 1980) (Stem and Alberger incorporate by reference their entire opinion from the first Anhydrous Ammonia case). The opinions do not
make clear how much the Commissioners relied on the Trade Agreement Act's interpretation of the material injury definition.
45. Id at 29.
46. SENATE REPORT, supra note 6, at 212, reprintedin [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 7186, 7343-44.

47. Certain Gloves From the People's Republic of China, U. S. Int'l Trade Comm'n
Publ. No. 867, at 14 (March, 1978).
48. Section 201 provides:

19811

COMMUNIST MARKET DISRUPTION

industry, the inability of domestic firms to operate at a reasonable
level of profit, and significant unemployment or underemployment
within the industry.49 Mindful of the legislative intent that a lower
standard of injury be imposed in section 406 cases, 50 the Commis-

sioners accept a lesser change in these economic indicators as suffiunder section 406 than would
cient for a holding of material injury
51
be sufficient under section 201.
C.

SIGNIFICANT CAUSE

As the final element of his section 406 claim, the plaintiff must
show that the increase in imports was a "significant cause" of his
material injury.52 Like the material injury test, Congress intended
that significant cause be an easier standard to satisfy than the comparable "substantial cause" requirement of section 201. 53 On the
other hand, Congress intended the significant cause standard to

require a more direct causal relationship between the increase in
imports and the injury than does the "contributes importantly" stan-

dard that must be fulfilled in order to obtain adjustment assistance
under the Trade Act of 1974.54 Other than establishing these param(2) In making its determination under paragraph (I), the Commission shall
take into account all economic factors which it considers relevant, including (but
not limited to)(A) with respect to serious injury, the significant idling of productive facilities in the industry, the inability of a significant number of firms to operate
at a reasonable level of profit, and significant unemployment or underemployment within the industry.....
19 U.S.C. § 2251(b)(2)(A) (1976).
49. Id
50. SENATE REPORT, supra note 6, at 212, reprintedin [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 7186, 7343-44.
51. U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n Pub. No. 867, at 6, 22 (March, 1978); U.S. Int'l Trade
Comm'n Publ. No. 902, at 7, 20 (Aug., 1978); U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n Publ. No. 1,006,
at 24 (Oct., 1979); U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n Publ. No. 1,051, at 34 (April, 1980).
52. 19 U.S.C. § 2436(e)(2) (1976).
53. SENATE REPORT, supra note 6, at 211-12, reprintedin [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEws 7186, 7343-44. Section 201(b)(2)(C) defines substantial cause as "an increase
in imports .. . and a decline in the proportion of the domestic market supplied by
domestic producers." 19 U.S.C. § 2251(b)(2)(C) (1976). Section 201o(b)(4) defines substantial cause as "a cause which is important and not less than any other cause." 19
U.S.C. § 2251 (b)(4) (1976). This causation standard is easier to satisfy than that of section 301 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, section 201's direct predecessor. Section
301 required a plaintiffto prove that the increase in imports was a majorfactor in causing
his injury. Trade Expansion Act of 1962, Pub.L.No. 87-794, § 301, 76 Stat. 872 (repealed
1975). Congress's dissatisfaction with this stringent causation requirement prompted it to
adopt the substantial cause requirement in 1974. In doing so, however, Congress did not
one extreme of excessive rigidity to comintend "that the escape clause criteria go from
plete laxity." SENATE REPORT, supra note 6, at 121, reprintedin [1974] U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEWS 7186, 7264.
54. SENATE REPORT, supra note 6, at 212, reprintedin [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEws 7186, 7344. Section 251 of the Trade Act of 1974 provides for petitioning the
Secretary of Commerce for adjustment assistance. 19 U.S.C. § 2341 (1976). The Secre-

126

CORNELL INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 14:117

eters, however, the legislative history provides no guidance on the
significant cause issue. Due to this paucity of legislative guidance,
the various Commissioners are not unified in their approach to the
issue of causation.
In Certain Glovesfrom the People'sRepublic of China,55 the first

section 406 decision, Commissioner Parker interpreted the substantial cause requirement to mean that the causal connection between
the increase in imports and the material injury must be at least "factually identifiable." 56 In other words, if imports from the communist

country can be identified as a cause of the complainant's lost sales,
the causation requirement is met.5 7 The discussion of the causation

requirement in Gloves was merely dicta, however, because the Commission dismissed the complaint on other grounds. 5 8 Nonetheless,

the majority of Commissioners gradually adopted this vague and
easily satisfied standard, as evidenced by the first decision in Anhy59
drousAmmonia From the US.SR.

An alternative and more recent interpretation of significant
cause derives from the legislative history of the substantial cause

requirement of section 201.60 Commissioners Alberger and
Minchew first developed this interpretation in their concurring opinion in Clothespins, by noting that "a determination of 'significant
cause,' like 'substantial cause,' 'shall take into account all economic
factors which [the Commission] considers relevant, including (but
not limited to). . . an increase in imports. . . and a decline in the

proportion of the domestic market supplied by domestic producers.' ",61 Commissioners Stern and Alberger refined this economic
factor test in their dissenting opinion in the firstAnhydrousAmmonia
case by elaborating upon the factors to be considered in determining
whether significant cause exists. 62 They prescribe:
tary shall certify a firm as eligible for such assistance if he determines that increases in
imports of articles like or directly competitive with articles produced by such firm contributed importantly to a decline in that firm's sales or production. 19 U.S.C. -§ 2341(c)
(1976). "Contributed importantly" is defined, for these purposes, to mean a "cause
which is important but not necessarily more important than any other cause." Id
55. U. S. Int'l Trade Comm'n Publ. No. 867 (March, 1978).
56. Id at 13.
57. Id at 12-18.
58. The Commissioners first found that no material injury existed. Id at 7. Their
discussion of the significant cause issue was, admittedly, only for the sake of argument.
59. U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n Publ. No. 1,006, at 6 (Oct., 1979).
60. SENATE REPORT, supra note 6, at 120-24, reprintedin [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. &
ArD. NEws 7186, 7263-67; H.R. REP. No. 93-571, 93d CQng., 1st Sess. 111-13 (1973).
61. U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n Publ. No. 902, at 24 (Aug., 1978) (quoting SENATE
REPORT, supra note 6, at 212, reprintedin [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 7186,
7263).
62. U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n Publ. No. 1,006, at 27 (Oct., 1979).
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detailed analyses of the behavior of input costs and output prices, the history
and effects of expansion of domestic facilities, the character and timing of the
closing of U.S. plants, the growth of the Soviet share of the market, the
important
nature of alleged lost sales, and the recent turn-around of some
63
economic indicators in the face of increasing Soviet imports.

The Commission should find that significant cause exists if, after
examining all these factors, they conclude that the evidence links the
imports to the injury. A majority of the Commission later adopted
this more refined test in the second Anhydrous Ammonia opinion.64
Although the factually identifiable test for causation may still

have some vitality, the refined economic factor test more fully satisfies the legislative intent that the phrase "significant cause" connotes

a stronger causal relationship between imports and injury than the
phrase "contributes importantly.

' 65

Clearly, a factually identifiable

cause is not necessarily a greater cause than one that contributes
importantly. Moreover, the economic factor approach leads to
greater consistency and predictability of determinations of signifi-

cant cause under section 406.
III

REMEDIES UNDER SECTION 406
Section 406, like section 201, refers to sections 202 and 203 of
the Trade Act of 197466 for its remedy provisions. After receiving a
report from the International Trade Commission that market disrup-

tion exists, the President, in his discretion, 67 may: 1) increase or
impose a duty on the imports; 68 2) impose a tariff rate quota;6 9 3)

modify or impose a quantitative restriction on the import of the
product; 70 4) negotiate orderly marketing agreements that limit the
export of a product from certain countries as well as the import of
that product into the United States; 7 1 or 5) take any combination of
72
the above actions.

63. Id
64. U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n Publ. No. 1,051, at 10-12 (April, 1980).
65. See note 54 supra and accompanying text.
66. 19 U.S.C. §§ 2252-2253 (1976).
67. 19 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(1)(A) provides that, upon receiving an affirmative finding
from the International Trade Commission that market disruption exists, the President
shall provide import relief "unless he determines that provision of such relief is not in the
national economic interest of the United States." id
68. 19 U.S.C. § 2253(a)(1) (1976).
69. 19 U.S.C. § 2253(a)(2) (1976).
70. 19 U.S.C. § 2253(a)(3) (1976).
71. 19 U.S.C. § 2253(a)(4) (1976).
72. 19 U.S.C. § 2253(a)(5) (1976).
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QUOTAS

The remedies available to a successful section 406 plaintiff are
the same as those available under section 201. Yet, from among
those available, the remedies imposed in section 406 cases have consistently differed from those imposed in section 201 cases. In fact,
quotas are the only remedies imposed in section 406 cases. 73 This
difference in remedy selection can be attributed to the inherent differences between the economies of communist and western market
countries. 74

Because of their stifling effect on trade in general, quota remedies are frowned upon by Congress 75 and by international trade
commentators. 76 Hence, tariff, not quota, remedies are preferred in
section 201 cases. Communist economies, however, do not subscribe
to cost pricing.7 7 Consequently, an increase in the communist
exporter's cost by the imposition of a tariff will not necessarily be
reflected in the price at which they sell their imports. Since the
domestic producers will still face the lower prices attendant to disruptive market practices, they will not be able to regain some of their
market share and retrench themselves for future competition if a
tariff remedy is imposed. The recognition that a communist country
could absorb an increased tariff cost and still maintain low import
prices prompts the International Trade Commission to consistently
recommend a quota-based import restriction scheme in section 406
cases.

78

B.

A MORE SPEEDY RESPONSE

The fear that communist imports could cause market disruption
much more quickly than could non-communist imports prompted
Congress to tailor the section 406 procedures so as to effect speedier
responses to communist-caused market disruption. 79 For example,
the Commission must report the findings of a section 406 investigation to the President at the "earliest practicable time, but not later
than three months" after initiating the investigation.8 0 By contrast,
section 201 allows the Commission six months to investigate and
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
Trade
79.
80.

See note 78 infra and accompanying text.
See p. 119 supra.
See 19 U.S.C. § 2112 (1976).
See J. JACKSON, supra note 1, at 306-07.
See p. 119 supra.
U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n Publ. No. 902, at 14-15, 26-29 (Aug., 1978); U.S. Int'l
Comm'n Publ. No. 1,006, at 11-12 (Oct., 1979).
See notes 12-13 supra and accompanying text.
19 U.S.C. § 2436(a)(4) (1976).
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report. 8' In addition, if the President chooses to remedy a section
406 injury by negotiating an orderly marketing agreement (option 4,
above), 82 he must enter into such an agreement within sixty days
after receiving the Commission's report. 83 In comparison, section
84
201 imposes no time limit on the completion of such an agreement.
Finally, Congress included an emergency clause in section 406 that it
did not include in section 201. This clause allows the President to
initiate a market disruption investigation whenever there are reasonable grounds to believe that market disruption exists with respect to
an import from a communist country.8 5 Furthermore, if he finds
that emergency action is necessary, the President may proceed as if
the International Trade Commission had already made an affirmative determination that market disruption exists. If the Commission
ultimately finds that no market disruption exists, such emergency
86
actions cease to apply.
IV
INTERPRETATIONAL PROBLEMS AND THE
MISUSE OF SECTION 406: ANALYSIS
AND SUGGESTED
IMPROVEMENTS
A quota imposed under section 406 effectively restricts imports
from the communist country involved in a particular ruling. These
quotas, however, have no effect on other countries exporting the
same product. Such discriminatory import restrictions are possible
under section 406 because it focuses not on the product causing the
injury, but rather on the country of its origin. Section 201, on the
other hand, restricts the importation of the product regardless of its
origin. For example, if a plaintiff brings a successful section 406
action against the import of widgets from China, the International
Trade Commission will restrict China's export of widgets to the
United States. The import of widgets from any other communist or
non-communist country, however, will remain unaffected. An
81. 19 U.S.C. § 2251(d)(2) (1976).
82. See note 71 supra and accompanying text.
83. 19 U.S.C. § 2436(b)(2) (1976).
84. 19 U.S.C. § 2253(a)(4) (1976).
85. 19 U.S.C. § 2436(c) (1976). President Carter exercised this power by initiating
the investigation in Anhydrous Ammonia From the U.S.S.R., U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n
Publ. No. 1,051 (April, 1980).
86. 19 U.S.C. § 2436(c) (1976). Finding emergency action necessary, the President
imposed an immediate quota on imports of Soviet ammonia into the United States. Id.
at 1; 45 Fed. Reg. 3,875 (1980). When the International Trade Commission later determined that no market disruption existed, the quota was lifted. Anhydrous Ammonia
From the U.S.S.R., U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n Publ. No. 1,051 (April, 1980).
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affirmative determination under section 201, on the other hand,

would restrict imports of widgets from any country. The imposition
of a section 406 remedy, therefore, does not necessarily protect a
domestic industry from import competition because other imports of
that product may replace the restricted communist imports. Hence,

it is possible that the benefit of a section 406 restriction will not inure
to U.S. domestic producers, as Congress intended, but will inure to
the other foreign producers who replace the restricted import.
Domestic producers can only prevent this potential for replacement
of the restricted communist import by other countries by combining
the original section 406 action with a section 201 action against the

importation of the product in general.
Besides undue expense, 87 such double actions bring about the

imposition of unnecessary trade restrictions on communist countries.
In effect, the use of section 406, even concurrently with section 201,

gives rise to a hierarchy of protectionism in which communist
importers are singled out for trade restrictions before any non-com-

munist importers. 88 Forcing communist countries to sacrifice their
market shares before other foreign producers is unnecessary from an
economic viewpoint because the domestic producer will not necessarily receive any economic benefits. 89 This result merely seems to

express Congress's political choice that non-communist imports be
favored over communist imports.90
Article XIX of the GATT requires that all import restrictions
imposed by signatories upon each other be multilateral, 1 e., product,
87. See 43 Fed. Reg. 59,445 n.4 (Dec. 20, 1978) (remarks of Commissioner Alberger).
88. This is due to the shorter time limits (three month limit for a section 406 ruling
versus six month limit under section 201, see notes 80-81 supra and accompanying text)
and easier standards of injury and causation, see notes 38-65 supra and accompanying
text, of section 406.
89. After the section 406 restrictions are imposed, non-communist importers, who are
not affected by the section 406 restrictions, would increase the volume of their imports of
that product to replace the now-restricted communist imports, thereby robbing the U.S.
producers of any economic benefit from the section 406 restriction. Of course, if the
section 201 action eventually results in a restriction against the product (regardless of its
origin), the domestic producer will enjoy an economic benefit, le., he can increase the
volume of his sales by replacing the now-restricted imports of the product from any
country. This economic benefit, however, was not achieved through section 406-it was
achieved through section 201.
90. The economic justification for section 406 stems from a non-market economy's
ability to focus disproportionate amounts of the factors of production on one product for
import to the U.S. market. See p. 119 supra. This ability, however, is also inherent in all
non-communist, non-market economies. Section 406 is, therefore, underinclusive by
speaking only to communist countries and ignoring the threat of speedy market disruption from all other centrally controlled economies. Therefore, even if Congress' political
choice to disfavor communist imports was justified by a proper purpose, section 406, by
its underinclusiveness, fails to achieve that purpose. This political choice may be justifiable in cases involving imports of vital raw materials from communist countries. See text
accompanying note 101 infra.
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not country based.91 The focus of section 406 on the country of origin rather than on the product, therefore, would seemingly conflict
with Article XIX when section 406 is invoked against a GATT

nation. Careful negotiation of the conditions upon which socialist
nations have been admitted to GATT, however, has prevented this

conflict from arising. At present, there are six socialist country members of GATT:

Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, Poland,

Romania, and Hungary. 92 In the Protocols of Accession to GATT
for these countries, 93 GATT Contracting Parties agreed to gradually
reduce all quantity restrictions on imports from the acceding state.
As a safeguard, however, the Contracting Parties reserved the right

to impose discriminatory restrictions on the acceding state's exports,
if those exports cause serious injury to domestic producers. 94 This
reservation neatly avoids the Article XIX conflict. 95 If communist
countries are admitted to GATT in the future, their Protocols of
Accession will probably include similar reservations, thereby elimi-

nating the conflict between section 406 and Article XIX.
When it enacted section 406, Congress noted that the traditional
antidumping remedy for unfair import competition was. not available when dealing with communist countries because those countries
do not subscribe to market pricing. 96 Section 101 of the Trade
Agreements Act of 1979, 97 however, added section 773 to the Tariff
91. 4 GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TARIFFS AND TRADE, BASIC INSTRUMENTS AND
SELECTED DOCUMENTS, Art. XIX.

92. Grzybowski, Socialist Countriesin GA77, 28 AM. J. COMP. L. 539, 547 (1980). In
addition, Bulgaria has been admitted as an observer to GATT since 1967. Id.
93. Protocol of Accession of Yugoslavia, GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TARIFFS AND
TRADE, BASIC INSTRUMENTS AND SELECTED DOCUMENTS (15th Supp.) (1967); Protocol

for the Accession of Poland, June 30, 1967, 609 U.N.T.S. 236; Accession of Romania,
GATT Doc. L/3557 (1971); Accession of Hungary, GATT Doc. W/24/B (1967). There
were no Protocols of Accession for Cuba or Czechoslovakia because both countries were
members of GATT prior to their conversion to socialism. Grzybowski, supra note 92, at
547. See note 95 infra for the implications of this for Cuba and Czechoslovakia.
94. Id at 549.
95. It may be argued that the reservation does not resolve the potential conflict
between section 406 and Article XIX for two reasons. First, because there Were no Protocols of Accession for Cuba and Czechoslovakia, see note 93 supra, no such reservations
were made a condition of their GATT membership. It would appear, then, that the
application of section 406 to Cuba and Czechoslovakia would violate Article XIX.
Second, the reservations only allow GATT members to impose discriminatory restrictions if exports from the acceding state cause serious injury. Section 406 restrictions can
apply, however, upon a mere showing of material injury. See notes 38-51 supra and
accompanying text. In other words, section 406 may apply in cases where the reservation
does not permit discriminatory restrictions. Such application clearly violates Article
XIX.
96. See notes 14-17 supra and accompanying text.
97. Pub. L. No. 96-382, § 101, 85 Stat. 464 (1979) (codified in scattered sections of 19
U.S.C.A. (West 1980)).
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Act of 1930.98 This section prescribes a procedure by which the fair
market value of a product in a foreign country may be computed
when the ascertainment of that fair market value is otherwise impossible. 99 This procedure can be used to compute the fair market value
of products imported from communist countries, thereby making
possible the use of the traditional antidumping remedy for unfair
import cases involving those countries. °° The continued use of section 406, therefore, can no longer be justified by the inability of the
United States to adequately evaluate the unfair trade practices of
communist countries.
The only remaining valid justification for section 406, therefore,
lies in its application to vital raw materials cases.' 0 ' By favoring
non-communist suppliers of raw materials over communist suppliers, Congress achieves an important political goal-the prevention of
U.S. dependence on communist countries for these materials at the
expense of our traditional, more dependable suppliers. The continuing inability to accurately assess a communist country's trade practices and the real danger of a focused effort to make the U.S.
dependent upon it for vital raw materials justify the discriminatory
import restrictions of section 406. Accordingly, the use of section
406 should be limited to this purpose.
CONCLUSION
The special dangers inherent in imports from communist countries prompted Congress to enact section 406 of the Trade Act of
1974. The shorter time limits and the easier standards of section 406
make relief from market disruption easier to obtain than the relief
available under section 201. A careful analysis, however, indicates
that section 406 cannot be economically justified because U.S. producers do not necessarily receive any benefit from section 406. Furthermore, since the Trade Agreements Act of 1979, section 406 can
no longer be justified as a means to fill the gap created by the inability to use the traditional antidumping remedy against communist
countries. Therefore, the only valid justification remaining for sec98. Tariff Act of 1930, § 773, 19 U.S.C.A. § 1677(b) (West 1980).
99. Section 773(e) provides a means by which the cost of a product manufactured in

a communist country may be constructed. The fair market value is computed by adding
the constructed cost to a prescribed profit margin. 19 U.S.C.A. § 1677b (West 1980). See
also Electric Golf Carts from Poland, U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n Pub1. No. 740 (March,
1975); INTERFACE ONE, supra note 17, at 219-21 (remarks of Bruce Clubb).
100. The inability to find some cost basis for ascertaining fair market value was the
only reason why the traditional antidumping remedy was unavailable to combat imports
from communist countries. See notes 14-17 supra and accompanying text. Now that this
basis has been statutorily provided, no such hurdle exists.
101. See note 19 supra and accompanying text.
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tion 406 is its ability to assure that the United States will not become
dependent upon communist countries for the supply of vital raw
materials. Its use should be limited to the accomplishment of that
purpose.
Joseph A. Calabrese

